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ABSTRACT
The German blitzkrieg across France during May 1940 was the culmination of
three years of daring political and military moves that had brought most of Europe under
German control. It was the German dictator Adolf Hitler who had outguessed his
advisors. Yet, Hitler’s bold moves in Western Europe ended with his army’s dash across
France, and the failure to strike Great Britain that summer when the British were at one
of the weakest points in their entire history.
After Germany defeated France, Hitler began a fruitless period of waiting for
Great Britain to sue for peace. Unlike Hitler, some in the German High Command
believed that Great Britain would fight and that a coherent strategy was needed to defeat
that island nation. During late June 1940, two strategies emerged for defeating Great
Britain. The first, code- named Operation SEA LION, called for an invasion of southern
England. This plan was the surest way to bring about a decisive outcome, but also the
riskiest. Hitler nonetheless ordered that planning and training for the operation go
forward, a process halted by the Luftwaffe’s inability to defeat the RAF as the necessary
prelude to the invasion.
The strategic option less risky than an invasion of the British Isles called for an
attack on the important colony of Gibraltar. German planners believed that seizure of
“the Rock” would place immense stress on the British Empire and possibly force a
negotiated peace. In November, German military units were task-organized and trained
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for the operation, now code- named Operation FELIX. Hitler understood the importance
of Gibraltar, but wanted the approval of Francisco Franco, the Spanish dictator, before
ordering an attack. Hitler waited.
By the spring of 1941, Hitler had failed to act and had lost his opportunity to
strike Great Britain when it was most vulnerable. He did not have the will to make the
difficult decision and implement either strategy. After December 1940, Great Britain
would never again be in danger of an invasion of either the island home or of its valuable
colony.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1945 as Allied troops pushed toward Berlin, the German dictator
Adolf Hitler could well ask himself what had gone wrong. He could recall his successes
in the late 1930s and early 1940s, remembering with pride his rapid rearmament of the
Germany military, bloodless remilitarization of the Rhineland, his stunning Anschluss
with Austria, and his even more spectacular conquest of Czechoslovakia. It was he who
had outguessed his advisors on the likely reactions of the Allies; it was he whose
decisions and tactics had resulted in easy victories for Germany. But somehow the tide
had turned, and German defeat was now inevitable.
Hitler began World War II in Europe on September 1, 1939, by sending the
Wehrmacht into Poland. As in his previous operations, he hoped to limit the conflict and
avoid an all-out war. On September 3, however, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir
Neville Henderson, delivered an ultimatum to the Wilhelmstrasse demanding the
cessation of offensive operations and the withdrawal of German forces from Poland. Dr.
Paul Schmidt, chief interpreter for German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop,
was present when the British ultimatum was handed to Hitler and described the moment:
Hitler sat immobile, staring into space. He was not stunned, as was later asserted, nor did
he rant, as others claimed. He sat absolutely silent and unmoving. After an interval, which
seemed an eternity to me, he turned to Ribbentrop, who had remained standing frozen by the
window. “What now?” Hitler asked his Foreign Minister with a furious glare, as if to say that
Ribbentrop had misinformed him about the probable reaction of the British.1
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Years later Schmidt recalled that everywhere in the room he had seen looks of grave
concern. Hitler had miscalculated the British will to fight. In the coming months and
years, he would be unable or unwilling to devise a viable strategy to defeat Great Britain.
This failure would prove to be a fatal error.
Hitler did not want war with Great Britain. Since the early 1920s, he had
dreamed of an alliance with that sea power. In June 1935, he had achieved a major coup
with the signing of the London Naval Treaty. The treaty limited the size of the German
surface navy to 35 percent of the British Royal Navy, and later agreements allowed the
Germans to expand their U-boat fleet to 100 percent of that of the British. 2 AngloGerman relations deteriorated after 1935, however, and in November 1937, Hitler
advised his generals to add Great Britain to the list of possible enemies. As the Fuehrer
put it,
German policy had to reckon with two hate-inspired antagonists, Britain and France, to
whom a German colossus in the center of Europe was a thorn in the flesh, and both countries were
opposed to any further strengthening of Germany's position either in Europe or overseas. Both
countries saw in the establishment of German military bases overseas a threat to their own
communications and, as a consequence, a strengthening of Germany’s position in Europe.3

Nevertheless, Hitler still held to the hope that a peaceful arrangement could be worked
out between Germany and Great Britain. Horrified by the prospect of the Kriegsmarine’s
having to face the Royal Navy, Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander of the German
navy, approached Hitler to clarify the navy’s ability to confront the British. Hitler told
the admiral not to worry and promised that there would be no war with England until
1944 or 1945.4
By mid-May 1939, Hitler was forced to recognize that he might have to contend
with Great Britain’s belligerency and he began to formulate a strategy. On May 10, he
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issued Annex VI to the directive for war preparations that he had drawn up a month
earlier. 5 The annex, entitled “Directives for War against the Enemy Economy (Economic
Warfare) and Protective Measures for the German Economy,” was an attempt to
summarize his war strategy primarily against Great Britain. The Kriegsmarine and
Luftwaffe (air force), he wrote, would be the “most important instruments for attacking
the enemy economy.”6 He directed the navy to prepare for economic warfare against
Britain and France. The principal element in that campaign would be a blockade that the
German navy was unable to carry out, against an enemy it was not supposed to face for at
least another four years. His hope, nonetheless, was that he could avoid a clash with
Britain. As he commented two months later to Admiral Karl Doenitz, 7 his U-boat
commander, on no account must a war with Great Britain be allowed to develop. Such a
conflict, he pondered, would mean nothing less than “finis Germaniae.”8
After the defeat of Poland, Hitler’s attentions shifted to planning for invasion of
his neighbors to the west. With regard to Great Britain, he remained fixated on the idea
of blockade, but his naval and military high command began to see the need for
contingency planning for a possible invasion of that country. On November 15, Admiral
Raeder ordered that “the possibility of invading Great Britain be examined, a possibility
arising if certain conditions are fulfilled by the further course of the war.”9 Raeder
realized that planning and preparation would take time, and he did not want to be
surprised by a hastily issued invasion order from Hitler. The naval high command—
Oberkommando des Kriegsmarine (OKM)—coordinated its planning with the army and
air force staffs throughout November and December. 10 Shortly thereafter, General
Walther von Brauchitsch, head of the army high command (Oberkommando des Heeres
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OKH), directed it to compile an invasion study and coordinate it with the other services.
As a result of the planning, 11 all three staffs grew skeptical about the feasibility of an
invasion of Great Britain and planning for operations in Scandinavia and Western Europe
soon diverted their attention.
By late May 1940, German troops had achieved a decisive victory over the Allies
and had arrived on the Atlantic coast of France. At this point, Great Britain was at its
weakest and Germany at its strongest. While Britain still had a robust navy and airforce,
its army recently had suffered defeats in Norway and France. The British Expeditionary
Force (BEF) had been forced to abandon most of its heavy equipment on the beaches of
those two countries. Britain had gambled its army on the defense of France and had lost.
If Germany could “bridge” the English Channel, it would thus face a dramatically
weakened British defense. It was at this point that high- level German officers again
began to discuss the possibility of invading England despite the many difficulties.
While invasion was the most direct approach for defeating Great Britain, it was
not the only option. Britain was stretched thin around the world, and its military forces
had to contend with aggressive Japanese activity in the Far East and with Italian moves in
the Mediterranean area. In the summer of 1940, the Italians threatened Britain’s colonies
and Mediterranean supply lines. In North Africa, Italian military forces were preparing
to attack a much smaller British force in Egypt. The Italian navy also seemed to present a
strong threat to Britain’s vital Mediterranean supply line, which connected it to India,
Malaysia, and Australia.
With Italy positioned to strike Egypt and the Suez Canal from its colonies in
North Africa, a German operation against Gibraltar could result in strategic benefits for
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the Axis. Since the Peace of Utrecht (1713), the Rock had held enormous significance
for the British Empire. 12 Although Gibraltar is only three miles long and three quarters of
a mile wide, its rugged terrain gave the British control of the fourteen- mile-wide strait
connecting the Mediterranean with the Atlantic Ocean. From Gibraltar, British coastal
artillery, aircraft, and warships were able to protect vital convoys to the eastern colonies,
block German surface ships from entering the Mediterranean, keep Italian battleships
inside, and constantly remind Spain of Britain’s military might. If Germany were able to
seize Gibraltar, the Mediterranean would be closed to British shipping, the British forces
in North Africa and the Middle East would be in peril, and the Italians would be in a
much stronger strategic position throughout the region. More importantly, the shock of
losing Gibraltar might bring the British to the bargaining table—an outcome that Hitler
hoped for.
The six- month period from June to December 1940 loomed, therefore, as perhaps
the most critical time in the entire war. Either an invasion of England or the capture of
Gibraltar might have secured Germany’s western flank. But Hitler’s decisions, or his
indecision, in 1940 led to the abandonment of invasion plans and of an attack on the
strategic British colony. Hitler’s inability to carry out a campaign gave the British a
desperately needed respite and, after his decision to launch the invasion of the Soviet
Union, led to a dreaded two-front war and eventually to Germany’s total defeat.
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CHAPTER 2
GREAT BRITAIN REFUSES TO SURRENDER
In late May 1940 Hitler still believed that once Germany defeated France, Great
Britain would sue for peace, which would end the war in the West, securing Germany’s
western flank. Hitler expected the n to turn his attention eastward to the USSR, the
country he considered his main enemy. Despite his optimistic expectation of British
capitulation, some in the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
or OKW) believed that the defeat of Britain would require much more, beginning with
innovative strategic planning. Nevertheless, Hitler continued to believe that the British
were on the verge of collapse and that any plans for invasion were premature.
Admiral Raeder, one of Germany’s most gifted strategic thinkers, realized that
any seaborne attack on Great Britain would require a great deal of preparation and would
be risky in terms of troops, material, and national prestige. On May 21, the day after
German armored columns reached the Atlantic coast of northern France, he approached
Hitler to discuss the possibility of an invasion. 1 That meeting was the first documented
occasion on which Hitler gave serious thought to an amphibious operation against the
British Isles. 2 Raeder briefed him on previous planning by the naval planning staff and
stated his strong opinion that an invasion would require complicated and lengthy
preparation. Hitler absorbed Raeder’s remarks and subsequently issued an order stating
that for the time being no preparations for a landing were to be made. Raeder also asked
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Hitler if he wanted to use U-boats currently in training for operational missions in order
that the war might be ended quickly. Hitler did not respond with regard to the length of
the war, but did state that Germany’s long-term program for submarine training and
construction should continue. His actions indicate that at the time he had not yet
considered invasion as a necessary option and remained committed to carrying out a
blockade. 3
Following the meeting with Hitler, Raeder directed Rear-Admiral Kurt Fricke, the
Chief of the Operations Division at OKM, to make a more detailed plan of war against
Great Britain. On May 27 Fricke circulated a memorandum entitled “Study England,”
which he moved the proposed landing area to the southeast shores of England, instead of
the north central area. The navy, sailing from French ports, would thus face a shorter
Channel crossing. 4 If the Luftwaffe could first neutralize the Royal Air Force (RAF),
Fricke pondered, it could then force the Royal Navy out of the Channel area and more
freely lay barrier mine fields there, which would permit the concentration of German
invasion forces in French ports. He opposed any plan that would require a lengthy time
period for concentrating men and materials in the area, as this would rule out any
possibility of a surprise attack. Fricke conceded that the German fleet was small and
relatively weak compared to that of the British and French, but he believed that an
invasion was possible if undertaken quickly and with as large a force as possible while
England was still recovering from its recent defeats. 5
Meanwhile, Hitler continued to plan for a naval and air blockade of Britain. In
directives issued on May 24 and 26, he stated that a German victory in Belgium and
northern France was near and that the complete defeat of France would follow. 6 With
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these outcomes in mind, he directed the Kriegsmarine to focus on blockading Great
Britain, while the Luftwaffe began preparations for operations against the British aircraft
industry, which he believed would weaken the RAF, the last powerful weapon that
England, in his opinion, had to use against Germany. For the time being, however, the
Luftwaffe was still engaged in the Battle of France and would need time to adjust to that
new mission, one that would require replacement of recent losses and re-deployment to
newly-acquired bases. Hitler also realized that the Kriegsmarine had suffered
irreplaceable losses to its surface fleet during the Norwegian campaign, which severely
limited Germany’s ability to carryout a successful invasion of England or even impose a
blockade. 7
In early June, German efforts were still focused primarily on France. The Low
Countries and Northern France had fallen and the German army was poised to attack the
remnants of the French army in central France. While the English were still a viable and
tenacious foe, Hitler believed optimistically that a German victory was almost within
arm’s reach, and that as soon as Britain awoke to the fact that it was defeated, it would
sue for peace. He occasionally spoke of a coming blockade of Britain, but gave no
indication that he was giving serious thought to invasion. Hitler believed that the primary
task of the army had been achieved, and that once the defeat of France was complete the
navy and air force would wage the war against Britain. 8 All indication was that the OKW
did not consider invasion to be a possibility. During all of this, the British were working
feverishly to rebuild their army and to construct invasion defenses. 9
On June 5, German armored units breached France’s hastily constructed defenses
dubbed the “Weygand Line,”10 dashing any hope that France would be able to stop
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Germany. 11 Italy until now had been reluc tant to enter the conflict, but on June 10,
realizing that France was defeated and hoping to easily gain territory and influence,
Benito Mussolini declared war on France and Great Britain. A week later, the newly
formed French government of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain requested an armistice. 12
This request prompted Winston Churchill to deliver his “finest hour” speech:
What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of
Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. The
whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned against us. Hitler knows that he will
have to break us in this island or lose the war. Let us therefore brace ourselves so that if the
British Commonwealth and Empire last for a thousand years men will still say, ‘this was their
finest hour.’13

Churchill knew that dark days were ahead.
Hitler did not respond as expected. He saw the French request for an armistice as
a prelude to peace with Britain and still gave no indication that he was considering
invasion. Four days earlier, on June 13, General Jodl’s deputy, Colonel Walter
Warlimont, Chief of the Planning Section at OKW, had told Fricke that “with regard to a
landing in Britain, the Fuehrer ha s not up to now expressed such an intention, as he fully
appreciates the unusual difficulties of such an operation. Therefore, even at this time, no
preparatory work of any kind has been done at OKW.”14 At this late stage, the high
commands of both the German army and the Luftwaffe appeared unaware that Hitler was
discussing an invasion. Valuable time for detailed planning, training, and the assembling
of necessary equipment and units was passing. And as the days went by, defenses in
southern England would grow stronger.
On June 20, Hitler met with his top military leaders to discuss the armistice terms
to be offered to France. 15 Almost as an afterthought, he mentioned future military plans.
He did not broach the subject of an amphibious assault on Great Britain. It had been a
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little over a month since Raeder had spoken to him about that possibility. The admiral
believed that it was the right time to press Hitler regarding England and make sure that
hasty invasion orders were not imminent. 16 Raeder stated that “Air supremacy is
necessary for an invasion” and that “the air force must be able not only to eliminate any
threat by British naval forces, but also to provide bridgeheads with paratroops after the
coastal defenses have been destroyed.”17 He urged that the Luftwaffe begin air attacks on
British bases to destroy ships under construction and repair and also recommended
attacks on British merchant shipping. The briefing seemed to have little influence on
Hitler, who told the group that he did not believe an invasion would be necessary,
considering the rout of the BEF at Dunkirk. 18 The Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine could end
any continued resistance with air attacks and a naval blockade, and, Hitler indicated,
peace would follow. The next day the French government signed the armistice. 19
At this critical point, Hitler decided to move his headquarters from Bruly-dePesche to a new location code named “Tannenburg” in the Black Forest. 20 He did not
relocate with his staff, but instead accompanied two of his World War I comrades on
visits to that war’s battlefields. Prior to his departure on June 25 he informed the
Operations Staff of OKW “that in a few days he would want to examine some basic
studies for an invasion of Britain.”21 Hitler’s request was not urgent and did not indicate
a willingness to implement an invasion. He still believed peace was at hand. He
reportedly told General Jodl: “The English have lost the war but they haven’t yet noticed
it; one must give them time, and they will soon come around.”22 This mood continued
upon his arrival at Tannenburg on June 29. Hitler and his staff appeared to be relaxed
and unconcerned about the problem at hand—namely, the war. Indeed, from June 23 to
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July 11, Hitler did not meet with the army or navy commanders- in-chiefs, who continued
to operate under the assumption that economic warfare was the Fuehrer’s war plan. 23 In
mid-June, OKW had ordered the army to reduce its size from 160 divisions to 120
divisions—approximately 25 percent of its total force. 24 Also in mid-June, Raeder sent a
memorandum to the German Naval Group West regarding the navy’s future task—and
did not include an amphibious assault on Great Britain among them. 25
Across the Channel, the stubborn British gave no sign of surrender. The need for
decisiveness and planning was increasingly apparent. On June 30, Hitler’s closest
military advisor, General Jodl, presented to him a six-page report entitled “The
Continuation of the War against England,” in which he proposed two basic courses of
action: attacking the English motherland or extending the war to the periphery. 26 Jodl
suggested three possible types of campaigns to be employed in an assault on the British
home islands. In the first, the three military services would impose a traditional siege in
an attempt to neutralize the RAF and destroy the British aircraft industry. This siege
would be supplemented by attacks on Britain’s maritime commerce and port installations,
along with bombing of supply depots and transportation network. The second possibility
was terror bombing, coupled with a propaganda campaign directed at the population
centers. This method, “allied with propaganda and periodic terror attacks, announced as
reprisals,” Jodl thought, would, “force the British Government to capitulate.”27 The third
option was a combination of the first two, followed by an invasion to administer the coup
de grace to a beaten enemy. Jodl described the conditions in detail:
A landing in England can only be contemplated after Germany has gained control of the air.
A landing in England, therefore, should not have as its objective the military defeat of England,
which is an objective that the Luftwaffe and Navy can achieve, but rather to give the coup de
grace, if necessary, to a country whose war economy is already paralyzed and whose air force is
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no longer capable of action. This situation will not occur before the end of August or the
beginning of September. We must count on the opposition of about twenty English divisions, so
at least thirty German divisions must be used. An invasion must nonetheless be prepared in all
details as a last resort.28

Jodl thus believed that a full- scale invasion would not be necessary if certain conditions
had been met.
The general finished his briefing with a halfhearted attempt to explain a second
course of action—attacking Great Britain’s more vulnerable periphery. By striking at its
colonial possessions, Germany could seriously limit Great Britain’s ability to continue
the war by denying it vital resources. The capture of important British colonies would
also deliver a significant blow to British morale. The Mediterranean theater offered
several attractive targets for this option. If Germany seized either the Suez Canal or
Gibraltar, it could considerably reduce the flow of food, raw materials, such as oil, as
well as troops, from Britain’s important eastern colonies, such as Iraq, India, and
Australia. Axis control of the Mediterranean’s two strategic outlets would force the
removal of Britain’s Mediterranean Fleet. This action would enhance Italy’s strategic
position and would allow the Italian navy to conduct operations in the Atlantic and Indian
Oceans—further tightening the blockade of the British Home Islands. 29
Hitler believed Jodl’s suggestions were irrelevant, as he continued to think that
the British would accept his peace terms—which he thought were generous. 30 Jodl later
echoed Hitler’s statements, saying it was only a matter of time until Britain surrendered
to Germany. 31 In the last days of June, peace seemed to be imminent. Hitler and others
in the OKW still lived under the illusion that Great Britain would surrender when the first
bombs were dropped—or sooner. Hitler considered plans for invading England or
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attacking its colonies premature and unneeded. Jodl’s report, nonetheless, would lay the
framework for planning that took place later that summer and fall.
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CHAPTER 3
OPERATION SEA LION: THE DIRECT APPROACH
At the beginning of July 1940, Britain still showed no willingness to surrender;
Hitler, however, was still confident that peace was just around the corner. Throughout
the month, he slowly moved on a two-track approach to deal with Great Britain,
authorizing planning for a possible invasion, but continuing to extend a thorny peace
offer to what he viewed as a beaten foe. By the end of the month, Hitler had held three
major strategy conferences on the invasion, in which he only confused his planners about
national strategy and direction.
On July 1, General Halder met with Admiral Raeder’s chief of staff, Admiral Otto
Schniewind, to discuss an invasion of Great Britain. According to historian Telford
Taylor, this was the first high- level army- navy discussion of the subject. 1 Later that same
day, Hitler met with the Italian Ambassador to Berlin, Dino Alfieri, at Hitler’s
Tannenburg headquarters. Alfieri brought offers of Italian troops and aircraft for use
against Great Britain. Hitler did not respond to Alfieri’s offer, but he did propose joint
bombing of the Suez Canal. Germany itself, he told Alfieri, was preparing a devastating
air attack on Great Britain. There is no record that the two men discussed the possibility
of an invasion. 2
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The next day, however, Hitler unexpectedly directed the OKW planning staff to
initiate invasion planning in the service high commands. The order, signed by Keitel
rather than Hitler, stated:
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided a landing in England is possible,
provided that air superiority can be attained and certain other necessary conditions can be fulfilled.
The date of commencement is therefore still undecided. All preparations are to be begun so that
the operation can be carried out as soon as possible. All preparations must bear in mind that the
plan to invade England has not taken any sort of definite shape as yet, and that these are only
preparations for a possible invasion.3

The final sentence of the directive suggests that Hitler remained lukewarm about the idea
of invasion. That Keitel signed the order and not Hitler himself perhaps further reflects
the Fuehrer’s lack of enthusiasm.
Although Hitler did authorize preliminary planning for an invasion, he still
believed that such an operation would be unnecessary. The surprise British attack on the
French fleet at Mers el-Kebir on July 3 helped to destroy that notion and confirmed what
most German officers already believed: the British wo uld fight, not negotiate. 4 The
attack also drove home to German naval planners the point that large-scale Axis
cooperation in naval operations was impossible as long as Gibraltar was in British
control. Hitler continued to hope that Britain would settle for a negotiated peace and on
July 11 told Raeder that he planned to make a peace offer in a speech to the Reichstag.
Raeder thought that the speech would serve to make the British public aware of
Germany’s gambit. He urged Hitler to authorize a declaration of blockade and air attacks
on British cities to place additional pressure on the enemy population. He predicted that
if the British people were made to feel the effects of the war there would be a speedy
termination of it and stressed to Hitler the dangers of an invasion, which he believed
should be used only as a last resort. Raeder repeated his earlier statement that Britain
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could be defeated by economic warfare combined with heavy air attacks on its main
population centers, such as Liverpool. Although Hitler agreed with Raeder’s heavyhanded approach, he was still inclined to make a qualified peace offer. 5
On July 12, General Jodl issued an updated plan for invasion, to which he gave
the name Operation LION.6 He considered Britain’s sea power to be Germany’s greatest
strategic problem, but believed that going ashore in southern England would give the
Reich the best chance for success. With a more narrow Channel to cross, Germany could
substitute air power for the naval power it lacked. Jodl suggested that the landing take
place by way of a river crossing on a broad front, and that the Luftwaffe provide direct
support to the ground troops. 7 The first wave of landing troops would have to be
especially powerful and would require a sea lane completely secure from naval attacks.
Although Hitler demanded surprise, this goal would be impossible because a large
transport concentration in the northern French ports could not be concealed from RAF
reconnaissance, but the shorter distance seemed worth the risk. 8
The following day, July 13, Hitler received General Walther von Brauchitsch, the
commander-in-chief of the German army, and Halder at his mountaintop retreat, the
Berghof, where they discussed plans for war with Britain. 9 The army high command’s
attitude had changed and it now believed that invasion was Germany’s best hope of
ending the war in the West. Halder was well prepared with facts and maps and made a
convincing presentation for landings in England. Hitler liked what he heard and now
seemed to support the idea, but could still not understand why the “beaten” British would
not accept his offers of peace. On July 14, Churchill made the British position clear:
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“We shall seek no terms, we shall tolerate no parley…[L]et all strive without failing in
faith or in duty, and the dark curse of Hitler will be lifted from our age.”10
On July 16, Hitler issued Fuehrer Directive Number 16, entitled “Preparations for
a Landing Operation against Great Britain.” The strategic concept of the directive was
captured in the opening paragraph:
Since Britain, despite its hopeless military situation, still shows no indication of a desire to
come to terms with us, I have decided to prepare an invasion, and, if necessary, to carry it out.
The aim of this operation is to eliminate the British homeland as a base for continuing the war
against Germany and, in case of need, to occupy it completely.11

Hitler’s “if necessary” indicated that he still hoped that a military confrontation might be
avoided. If the landing did prove necessary, he wanted it to be a surprise river crossing
on a broad front. The plan for what he called Operation SEA LION, was to be ready by
the end of July and actual preparations for the landing were to be completed by midAugust. A prerequis ite for an invasion, he told his military leaders, was the achievement
of air superiority by the Luftwaffe.
The day before Hitler issued Directive No. 16, he had responded to Mussolini’s
repeated offers to send Italian troops to attack Great Britain. 12 In a long letter, Hitler
outlined the difficulties involved in an invasion operation, such as specialized training
and long preparation time. He suggested that an Italian invasion of Egypt would be an
excellent alternative, but stated that with so many possibilities for action in the
Mediterranean it did not matter where Italy attacked. 13 The letter shows Hitler’s failings
as a diplomat and strategist. Italy’s actions in the Mediterranean area did matter greatly,
and Hitler’s failure to coordinate their plans and operations eventually led to Mussolini’s
disastrous campaigns in North Africa and the Balkans.
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Hitler’s decision to prepare for invasion produced different reactions among his
generals. At OKH, Halder and von Brauchitsch were optimistic about the invasion, and
planning there rapidly gained momentum. 14 In accordance with Hitler’s directive, the
OKH general staff decided to start planning for a wide front instead of a narrow front,
which the navy advocated, and issued orders allocating forces for the landing. 15 In the
initial assault, approximately 90,000 troops would be landed with the total number rising
to 260,000 by the third day. 16 After the breakout from the beachheads, the German army
could quickly surround London and occupy the rest of the country within a month. The
reaction was different at OKM, where planners continued to stress SEA LION’s
weaknesses. On July 17, Raeder warned von Brauchitsch that a landing would be risky
and that Germany could possibly lose the entire invading force. Raeder’s warnings,
however, did not dampen the army’s growing enthusiasm for invasion. 17
On July 19, Hitler appeared before the Reichstag and offered peace to Britain:
In this hour I believe I am conscience bound to make a renewed appeal to England. I
believe I can do this because I am not the vanquished seeking favors, but the victor speaking in the
name of reason. Mr. Churchill may well turn aside my declaration with the cry that this appeal
represents only my fear and my doubts about final victory. All I can say is that I have lightened
my conscience in view of what is coming.18

The speech was one of his best, but, as the American reporter William Shirer noted,
although it was clever and eloquent, it was, as usual, full of deceit. About an hour after
Hitler’s speech, a BBC announcer responded with a resounding “No!” Hitler chose to
believe that the BBC announcer was acting as a mouthpiece of the British Government.
The enemy leader’s speech, Churchill later declared, had needed no official reply. 19
The British had recovered from the shock of their defeat at Dunkirk and were now
determined to offer fierce resistance. On the day of Hitler’s speech, the OKM Staff
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completed a report that was highly skeptical of Germany’s ability to execute an
invasion. 20 Raeder stated that the task allotted to the navy was out of all proportion to its
strength and that it bore no relation to the tasks given to the army and Luftwaffe. 21 Some
in the German army believed that the Kriegsmarine was getting “cold feet,” as it had
prior to Norway. 22
Hitler convened three additional planning conferences for SEA LION—July 21,
25, and 31. 23 At the first one, held in Berlin, he again expressed hope that Britain would
surrender, but assured his subordinates that an invasion would end the war in the West if
Britain resisted. 24 Landing in England, he knew, would be “an exceptionally daring
undertaking, because even though the passage is short, it is not merely a question of
crossing a river, but of crossing a sea which is controlled by the ene my.” The operation
would require forty divisions, he said, and they would face a serious logistical challenge.
“We cannot count on obtaining supplies of any kind in Britain,” he commented. 25 He
noted that the time of year and weather were important considerations making it
necessary that the Luftwaffe establish its dominance by early September. Hitler ended
the conference by asking Raeder and the navy some pointed questions. He wanted
Raeder to provide him with a full report on the navy’s ability to protect the crossing, the
date that the naval artillery would be ready, and the length of time needed for the navy’s
technical preparations. 26 Hitler did not question the Luftwaffe, as he incorrectly believed
that the operation depended upon the Kriegsmarine. In reality, the entire operation and
its timing depended on the success of the Luftwaffe, whose commander- in-chief,
Hermann Goering, did not even bother to attend the meeting but instead sent his chief of
staff, General Hans Jeschonnek. 27
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On July 25, Raeder expressed a somewhat more optimistic outlook. He advised
Hitler that if the RAF was defeated the Kriegsmarine could overcome many of the
previously mentioned obstacles. Only then, he cautioned, would it be possible to carryout
the necessary preliminary measures such as clearing and laying of mine fields and
converting barges for amphibious operations. Nevertheless, the admiral remained wary
of the Kriegsmarine’s ability to carryout SEA LION and pointed out the negative effect
that an invasion would have on the German economy and war production. In a
memorandum on the navy’s transportation capability, Raeder pointed to dire
consequences of the operation for inland shipping, armament production, the food
economy, private industry, and trade. 28
Three days later, on July 28, General Halder received a forewarning about a
gloomy report that OKM was going to present at the upcoming conference. The
Kriegsmarine’s planners now asserted that invasion loading could only be completed in
designated ports and not on open beaches, while the first assault wave would require ten
days to land. Now, it was OKH’s turn to express reservations. “If that is true,” Halder
wrote, “all previous statements of the navy were so much rubbish and we can throw away
the whole plan of an invasion.”29 The next day he dispatched the chief of the OKH
operations branch, Colonel Hans von Greiffenberg, to confer with the naval staff in order
to understand better the navy’s problems. This was the first direct contact between toplevel army and navy planners regarding this operation although it loomed as the most
ambitious amphibious undertaking in German history and intensive planning had been
underway for over a month. 30 The colonel noted the four main hurdles:
1.

The army’s demand for a dawn landing and the navy’s need for a half moon for maneuvering.
This limited execution of SEA LION to three or four days of any month.
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2.

3.
4.

Thus S Day fell into the last days of September, a notably bad weather period, so that, though
the first wave might by good luck succeed in landing, the same could not be counted on for
subsequent waves.
Neither mine barriers nor air superiority could prevent the incursion of enemy fleet units into
a crossing zone stretching from the Thames to Lyme Bay.
The paucity of landing craft demanded that the second wave could not start landing until
forty-eight hours after the first, and eight to ten days would be required to get the second
wave over completely, once it started.31

The navy concluded by advocating the abandonment of SEA LION and refocusing on
siege warfare. If siege warfare did not produce the desired outcome, the Kriegsmarine
planners believed SEA LION might then be reconsidered in May 1941. Raeder was in
full agreement and also recommended postponement. 32
It was now OKH’s turn to express hesitation and look to the Mediterranean for
more attractive options. On July 30, von Greiffenberg returned to OKH and briefed
OKM’s military position. Von Brauchitsch and Halder agreed that SEA LION was not
practical given the navy’s situation. Halder noted the following in his diary: “The navy
in all probability will not provide us this fall with the means for a successful invasion of
Britain. Wait until spring ’41 (May).” He and von Brauchitsch realized that the delay
would only strengthen Britain, and they expressed interest in opening a major front in the
Mediterranean area. They saw five options, but Gibraltar topped their list:
1. Attack on Gibraltar (from the land side, through Spain).
2. Support Italians with armor in North Africa (Egypt).
3. Attack British in Haifa.
4. Attack Suez Canal.
5. Incite Russians to a Drive on Persian Gulf.33

Going into the planning conference on July 31, it appeared that the high commands of
both the Kriegsmarine and army were opposed to an invasion of England at that time. It
also appeared that they viewed an operation against Gibraltar as an option.
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The final major planning conference for SEA LION was held at the Berghof on
July 31. 34 Raeder opened the session by informing Hitler that the invasion would have to
take place between September 19 and 26, before weather conditions precluded it. The
Channel had to be relatively calm for the barges of the first wave to load in France,
complete the channel crossing, and safely beach and disembark their cargo in England.
That late start, nevertheless, would involve weather difficulties for the follow-on and
support phases of the operation. Raeder also advised Hitler that the army’s request for a
broad front landing would be “unjustifiable” given the limited assets of the Kriegsmarine
and Luftwaffe and asked the Fuehrer to limit the invasion to the Dover Straits in order to
reduce vulnerability. The admiral then closed his briefing with an appeal to delay the
entire operation until the following spring. 35
After hearing Raeder’s report, Hitler issued clearer orders regarding SEA LION,
but ended his response by identifying Gibraltar as an attractive option. With regard to the
invasion:
An attempt must be made to prepare the operation for 15 September 1940. The army
should be ready for action by then. The decision as to whether the operation is to take place in
September or is to be delayed until May 1941 will be made after the air force has made
concentrated attacks on southern England for one week. The air force is to report at once when
these attacks will commence. If the effect of the air attacks is such that the enemy air force,
harbors, and naval forces, etc., are heavily damaged, Operation SEA LION will be carried out in
1940. Otherwise it is to be postponed until May 1941. 36

Hitler argued for decisive action in the fall by saying that German forces would need to
reckon only with a small poorly equipped British Army. Noting the instability of the
Italians, especially in Africa, he suggested bringing Spain into the war and seizing
Gibraltar. Hitler seemed to recognize the value of the Rock, as he continually passed
over various other concepts. But while he agreed that diversionary maneuvers, such as
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seizing Gibraltar, should be studied, he made clear that only an invasion of Britain would
produce decisive results.
At this point in the conference Hitler turned his attention to the Soviet Union. He
said that if an invasion of England did not take place, Germany’s actions “must be
directed to eliminate all factors that let England hope for a change in the situation.”
Hitler named those factors as the USSR and America and stated:
Britain’s hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture,
America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase
Japan’s power in the Far East. Russia is the Far Eastern Sword of Britain and the United States
pointed at Japan. Here an unpleasant wind is blowing for Britain. Japan, like Russia, has its
program, which it wants to carry through before the end of the war. Russia is the factor on which
Britain is relying the most. All that Russia has to do is to hint that it does not care to have a strong
Germany, and the British will take hope, like one about to go under, that the situation will undergo
a radical change within six or eight months. With Russia smashed, Britain’s last hope would be
shattered. Germany then will be master of Europe and the Balkans. Decision: Russia’s
destruction must therefore be made a part of this struggle. Spring 1941. The sooner Russia is
crushed the better.37

This logic fit perfectly with Hitler’s long- held goals of conquering Lebensraum (living
space) in the Soviet Union. If it had been possible, Hitler would ha ve immediately turned
to the East and destroyed Russia, which was much more in line with his Weltanschauung
as expressed in Mein Kampf.38 The East was where Hitler believed Germany’s true
enemy lay and, he felt, a victory there would force Britain to make peace. He decided
that the planning staff at OKW and OKH must begin work immediately on the Russia
campaign. 39
With victory in the West uncertain, it is odd that Hitler ordered vital planning
resources redirected away from Great Britain, his only remaining enemy at that time.
This brings to question SEA LION’s viability—was it only a secondary operation to
Hitler? Perhaps he was only killing time while awaiting the realization of his ambitions
in the East, which had long been the foundation of his grand plan. The debate over SEA
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LION revealed how indecisive and impulsive Hitler was when it came to issues of basic
strategy. “Instead of observing Clausewitz’ dictum that war required a concentration of
effort against the enemy,” Charles Burdick has noted, “Hitler diffused his energies and
interests.”40 By the end of July, he had confused his high command on matters of
national strategy, timing, and goals. If SEA LION was to go forward, the German
military needed to plan, prepare, and execute quickly a successful air campaign over
southern England.
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CHAPTER 4
GIBRALTAR: THE INDIRECT APPROACH
From early July 1940 on, Admiral Raeder and the OKM were well aware of one
immediate option (short of a full-scale invasion of the British Home Islands) for dealing
with Great Britain—the seizure of the British strategic colony of Gibraltar. By the end of
July, two German reconnaissance groups had reconnoitered the Rock. Hitler had been
informed of their findings and initiated diplomatic meetings with the Spanish government
on the issue. In early August, the high command, having noted Hitler’s interest, began to
discuss Gibraltar. By the end of the month, the OKW planners had prepared and
presented to Hitler a general attack concept for Gibraltar. He approved this plan, but still
remained committed to an invasion of Great Britain.
After Jodl’s suggestion of attacking key British colonies, Gibraltar rapidly
became the top target. On July 5, German naval planners advocated immediately striking
and occupying the Rock. 1 The capture of Gibraltar would be valuable for future German
operations and would shore up the Italians. Others in the German High Command also
viewed Gibraltar as an attractive target. In late June, General Heinz Guderian, the
armored warfare theorist who had been a key figure in the revision of plans for the
Blitzkrieg against Western Europe, “requested that the French armistice be deferred so
that he could rush with a couple of Panzer divisions across Spain, seize the Straits and
cross into French North Africa.”2 Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of Abwehr,
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Germany’s military intelligence service, was also convinced that Spain could be an
important military ally for both Germany and Italy. The next day Canaris conferred with
General Halder about possibly deploying his Abwehr group to Spain. 3
The growing German interest in Spain and Gibraltar was probably the result of
widespread public support in Spain and moves by its dictator, General Francisco Franco,
in June 1940. Following Italy’s entry into the war, Spain, on June 13, changed its status
from neutral to “non-belligerency,” suggesting pro-Axis neutrality. 4 The next day, when
Franco ordered Spanish troops to seized the international zone of Tangier, the streets of
Spain exploded with crowds chanting a slogan which probably caught some German
military leaders by surprise: “Gibraltar para España!”—Gibraltar for Spain. 5 During
this time, Franco sent his chief of staff, General Juan Vigon, to deliver a personal letter to
Hitler glorifying the achievements of Germany. 6 In his letter, Franco made clear that he
had no interest in entering the war, but would consider the possibility for the right price,
which included military and economic aid along with the return of Gibraltar, and the
acquisition of Tangier, French Morocco, and a redrawing of the border of Spanish
Guinea. 7 Hitler appeared disinterested and brushed Franco’s emissary aside after a short
meeting. 8
In mid-July, the OKW seized the initiative by ordering a reconnaissance mission
to Spain for the purpose of surveying Gibraltar. 9 The group, led by Canaris and including
intelligence and army operations specialists, departed quickly for Madrid, where it met
with General Vigon on July 23. Canaris advised Vigon that Germany wanted to discuss a
possible operation against Gibraltar. He requested Spanish assistance in mapping the
British defenses, estimating military needs for the assault, and establishing a joint
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intelligence center. The Spaniard seemed surprised by this suggestion. Canaris later met
with Franco to inform him personally of the German proposals. The Spanish dictator
acknowledged the benefits of a successful attack on Gibraltar, but expressed concern over
Spain’s possible fate. A large British reinforcement had recently arrived on Gibraltar and
he feared British reprisal. The British Royal Navy might move against the Canary
Islands or establish an economic blockade of Spain. Franco’s lack of enthusiasm for an
attack on Gibraltar was obvious, but he diplomatically gave his blessing for a German
reconnaissance mission—and nothing more. 10
Unknown to OKW, Canaris had dispatched to Spain a second special mission
with an entirely different concept for an attack on Gibraltar. 11 Canaris handpicked
Captain Hans-Jochen Rudloff, an experienced commando, to lead the group, which also
visited Spain late in July. Rudloff was to study the possibility of using a small highly
trained force to overwhelm the British garrison in a few hours with speed and surprise.
At most, he wanted to limit the attacking force to an Abwehr battalion and a combat
engineer battalion with limited artillery support. These units would move stealthy by
road and by sea to Gibraltar for the attack. After his reconnaissance mission, Rudloff
concluded that the idea of a surprise commando attack was foolhardy and did not warrant
further study. 12
Hitler kept his eye on the discussions in Madrid and on July 24 summoned
General Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, commander of the Luftwaffe’s VIII Air
Corps, to advise him of possible joint operations with Spain against Gibraltar. Hitler
outlined a broad concept of operations and suggested that the Spanish would have a
participating role only if they demanded one. Strong German forces, the Fuehrer
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indicated, would be ready to counterattack any British troops sent to the Iberian
Peninsula. After this short discussion, Hitler ordered von Richthofen to meet with his
Spanish friend Vigon, whom the latter had met during his days in Spain with the German
Condor Legion, and state the German position. 13
Meanwhile, the OKW reconnaissance group in Spain spent two days
reconnoitering the area around Gibraltar and immediately ruled out the possibility of
using parachute or glider troops because of Gibraltar’s steep terrain, irregular winds, and
lack of landing sites. 14 The German specialists also noted that Gibraltar was connected to
Spain by a narrow neck, which had been mined and was covered by multiple artillery and
machine guns. Any attack would thus be costly and difficult. Spanish road and rail
networks, furthermore, were deplorable and there was no possibility of secrecy. 15 The
group members told Canaris all this on July 27. 16 One suggestion was that the Spanish be
pressed to provide more information on Gibraltar. After their meeting, most of the
participants returned to Berlin, while Canaris, Colonel Hans Piekenbrock, and Colonel
Hans Mikosch prepared a general operational plan. 17
General von Richtofen, meanwhile, had left Berlin to meet with General Vigon at
Biarritz, Spain. Vigon already knew from Canaris about German designs on Gibraltar
and told Richtofen that Franco was interested, but that the Caudillo was reluctant to
become involved because of Spain’s economic and political situation. He surprised
Richthofen by informing him that Franco had already sent a message to Hitler requesting
that Richthofen be assigned as commander of the German troops allotted to the Gibraltar
project. Franco obviously did not want to enter the war, but found it prudent to placate
Berlin. 18

33

When Canaris completed his reconnaissance mission of Gibraltar in late July, he
compiled a lengthy report highlighting the findings of both teams and presented it to
Keitel and Warlimont on August 2. 19 Five days later, Warlimont held a conference with
members of his planning staff and instructed them to prepare new operational studies of
Gibraltar and Africa. 20 At the beginning of August the overworked planners thus had to
undertake another major project. They nonetheless quickly came up with general
proposals for Gibraltar and for broader operations in the Mediterranean based on the
assumption that SEA LION would be delayed until at least the spring of 1941. The
planners pointed out that campaigns waged in Africa and Gibraltar could each benefit the
other. Germany’s main requirement in Africa would be an armored force of sufficient
strength to support an Italian drive for the Suez Canal. The Axis capture of this strategic
waterway would close it to British shipping and would threaten British possessions in the
oil- rich Middle East. To execute either operation, Germany would have to overcome the
reluctance of its Axis partner because Mussolini, like Franco, was not receptive to
German troops’ meddling in what he viewed as his area of influence.
As Hermann Goering’s Eagle Day—the start of the air battle over Britain—
unfolded on August 13, Jodl, who was somewhat concerned with the uncertainty
surrounding the strategic direction of the war, drew up a memorandum on SEA LION in
which he revealed his misgivings. 21 “Under no circumstances must the landing operation
fail,” he declared. “The political consequences of a fiasco might be much more far
reaching than the military.”22 Unless all military prerequisites were fulfilled, he
continued, the landing would be a desperate venture, one that should be undertaken only
if the Reich were in a perilous situation, which it was not in at that time. He pondered
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that there were other less risky ways to defeat England. He acknowledged that the
current effort with Italy against Great Britain was unprofitable and should be redirected.
For example, if the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe were to impose a blockade—which had
been the plan before the invasion of the West—and simultaneous campaigns were
launched against Egypt and Gibraltar, a great deal of strain could be placed upon the
British Empire without much hazard. Jodl saw much more opportunity, with much less
risk, in pursuing this indirect course of action. He sent his memo to Keitel, who in turn
presented it to Hitler. 23
On August 14, Hitler approved the general attack concept for Gibraltar, but
emphasized that its capture was absolutely necessary and that anything less, such as
bombing the harbor and airfield, was unacceptable. And any plan for the operation, he
insisted, must be part of a military agreement with Spain, bringing that country into the
war. Hitler decided that he would wait until he completed his negotiations with the
Spanish dictator before assigning a commander to the operation. Warlimont described
the attitudes of Hitler and Jodl’s staff toward the various plans:
In so far [sic] as they appeared to lend support to a landing in England, Jodl’s staff did their
best to take over these ideas and push them forward. Hitler, however, received all these proposals
with equal lack of enthusiasm and in cases where they had anything to do with the Mediterranean,
only considered them after considerable delay and then let them drift into the background just as
he was doing with the landing in England.24

Warlimount and his staff on August 20 presented a more detailed plan to Jodl in
which they addressed some of the difficulties concerning the attack and also addressed
Spanish participation. 25 Most of the staff work had already been completed for the attack
and required little modifications from Warlimount, but the question of Spanish
participation needed some clarification. Franco suggested that he was willing to enter the
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war, but only under an unusual set of circumstances. He wanted first to issue a formal
protest to a German air attack on the Rock and then participate in a joint ground attack
with the Germans. Warlimont did not approve of this unorthodox approach and thought
Franco should declare war on Great Britain at the beginning of the operation. Four days
later, Jodl informed Warlimont that Hitler had approved the general attack plan and
agreed with the need for a Spanish formal statement of war. 26 In addition, Hitler had said
that Franco was willing to join the conflict if Germany agreed to give Spain great
quantities of food, fuel, and military equipment. Hitler did not believe this request would
hinder the Gibraltar operation or that it would it be difficult to accomplish once a German
victory had been secured. The new plan was forwarded to General Halder and the OKH
staff—at a time when they were deeply involved in preparing for SEA LION.
Meanwhile, at OKH tactical planning went forward. On August 22, Captain
Anton Staubwasser, an officer on the OKH intelligence staff, provided Halder with the
latest information on Gibraltar. 27 The British garrison, numbering approximately 10,000
troops, apparently had constructed elaborate defenses connected by numerous
underground tunnels and galleries. The enemy was believed to have stockpiled enough
food to last eighteen months, thereby eliminating the possibility of a siege. Staubwasser
estimated that the RAF contingent at Gibraltar included at least nineteen bombers,
thirteen reconnaissance and thirty-four fighter aircraft, and a considerable number of antiaircraft artillery pieces. Any attack, Staubwasser reasoned, would therefore be difficult
and costly.
On the other hand, there were weaknesses that Germany could exploit. For
example, the main British defensive line ran along the foot of a steep mountain face and
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some of the positions had fallen into neglect over the years. Furthermore, the heavy
weapons deployed in the defensive belt were not mutually supporting and could not
depress sufficiently to offer fierce resistance against a determined attack. Once the
narrow isthmus had been crossed, Staubwasser predicted, not more than twenty heavy
guns could be directed against the attackers. Therefore, once the troops crossed “no
man’s land,” the odds of success increased dramatically. As far as Spanish participation
was concerned, Staubwasser could see no role for Spain’s ill-trained and poorly armed
army beyond collecting intelligence and constructing facilities for German troops and
equipment. At the end of his briefing, Staubwasser again expressed pessimism about the
operation. 28
With the intelligence officer’s pessimistic briefing in mind, Halder’s frustration
over Hitler’s indecisiveness deepened. Now the Fuehrer appeared to support major
operations in the Mediterranean theater. Halder noted:
Pipe dreams: Spain is to be brought into war, but the economic consequences for that
country are ignored. North Africa is viewed as a theater of operations against Britain (Egypt, Asia
Minor; pushing British away from Cyprus and Haifa?!). The army is supposed to have everything
nice and ready without ever getting any straightforward instructions.29

A coherent and workable German strategy obviously was lacking. On August 27,
Admiral Canaris, just returned from a week in Spain, brought Halder further negative
news. 30 Canaris briefed Halder on his meeting on August 19 with General Vigon in
Madrid. At that meeting, Canaris had requested that the Spanish improve roads around
Gibraltar, make certain that key airfields were serviceable, and step up their own
intelligence collection. Vigon had agreed to this, but requested that Germany accelerate
its preparations because Spain’s food and fuel situation was growing more critical by the
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day. Canaris commented to Halder on the gloomy internal situation in Spain. There
were shortages of food and fuel, he said, and support for Franco was slipping. “The
consequences of having this unpredictable nation as a partner cannot be calculated,” he
offered. “We shall get an ally who will cost us dearly.”31 According to Canaris, Franco
was an unreliable ally who would not actively join the conflict until Great Britain was
defeated.
Canaris was right, although Franco still sought to persuade Berlin otherwise. Just
four days later, Mussolini told Hitler that he recently had received a letter from Franco in
which the Spanish leader spoke of entering the war soon. 32 Hitler now believed that
Spain was on the verge of committing to the Gibraltar operation and of joining the war
against Great Britain. At a planning conference on September 6 to set concrete dates for
SEA LION, Hitler issued orders to OKW to accelerate planning for Gibraltar. 33
Warlimont informed the OKW planners of Hitler’s interest and ordered that the Gibraltar
operation be given a higher priority. 34 On September 9, under orders from both Hitler
and Goering, General von Richthofen traveled to Franco’s summer headquarters at San
Sebastian to confer with him. 35 Franco praised the German air campaign against Great
Britain, but reiterated his concern regarding Spanish participation in any conflict. He
reminded the German emissary that if the British Navy imposed a blockade, Spain’s
limited stocks of grain, fuel, and other materials would dry up. Richthofen assured him
that a grateful Germany would cover any of Spain’s supply problems. He also stated that
Germany would provide the specialized troops and equipment needed for the capture of
Gibraltar, thus leaving Spain’s involvement in the conflict up to Franco. The Caudillo
remained uncommitted.
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Hitler still could not totally abandon SEA LION, however, and he could not make
the decision to begin the Gibraltar operation. The entire German strategy regarding Great
Britain depended on the defeat of the RAF by the Luftwaffe. As long as Hitler
considered SEA LION to be a viable operation, a German operation against Gibraltar or
Africa appeared to be a secondary operation. The hastily arranged meeting with Franco,
and Hitler’s willingness to offer so much, underlined a growing movement toward
Gibraltar. It was imperative that Hitler determine and initiate the most effective strategic
plan and carry it through to conclusion.
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CHAPTER 5
SEA LION ABANDONED
The first week of September 1940 marked the beginning of a critical period for
Germany in its war against Great Britain. In the air, the RAF had to be eliminated in
order for SEA LION to go forward. Although the Luftwaffe was optimistic about its
prospects for victory, it had little time to complete the required tasks. The target date for
invasion remained mid-September to allow for necessary preliminary measures. As this
time rapidly approached, Hitler had not yet set dates for completion of planning and the
initiation of preparations. When the Luftwaffe failed to defeat the RAF, Hitler sent
mixed signals to his military on the viability of SEA LION. By late-September, he had
not called off the invasion, but his three service commands had reduced their readiness
for one. A decision was needed from the Fuehrer.
Hitler issued a directive outlining a timetable for SEA LION on September 3.
The directive stated that the earliest possible date for departure of the invasion fleet was
September 20 with the landing to take place the following day. 1 To give the navy time to
prepare, Hitler stipulated that he would issue the order for the start of the operation ten
days before the actual day of departure from France, in other words probably on
September 11. 2 Hitler also made it clear that “all preparations must be made in such a
manner that the operation may be stopped as late as 24 hours” before the invasion fleet’s
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sailing from France. 3 With the date for the decision on SEA LION set, the Luftwaffe was
now on a timetable to defeat or at least cripple the RAF.
On September 6, Raeder reported to Hitler regarding the state of invasion
preparations. 4 He said that if “air supremacy is increasingly established it will be
possib le to meet the new deadline. The crossing itself will be very difficult.”5 Raeder
went on to state that “the execution of Operation SEA LION appears possible, if attended
by favorable circumstances regarding air supremacy, weather, etc.”6 He emphasized the
importance of the air war in harassing the British and in preventing enemy air and naval
interference in the Channel ports, stating that “owing to weather conditions and the
situation in air warfare, the planned operations of the mine-sweeping forces were delayed
until now and are still greatly hampered.”7 If the Luftwaffe did not defeat the RAF, then
the RAF would hinder the concentration of German shipping at the invasion ports and the
minelaying and minesweeping necessary before the invasion.
The admiral asked Hitler what his political and military directives were in the
event that SEA LION did not take place. Raeder believed that Germany should continue
to give the appearance of invasion but resources should be redirected to German industry
through the release of personnel and shipping engaged in preparing for SEA LION.
Hitler agreed with this line of reasoning. Raeder then offered alternatives to SEA LION:
The Naval Staff’s deliberations on further possibilities for warfare against Britain in
addition to, or in place of, Operation SEA LION are as follows: Gibraltar and the Suez Canal have
decisive strategic significance for German-Italian warfare in the Mediterranean area. Britain
should be excluded from the Mediterranean. Control of the Mediterranean area is of vital
importance to the position of the Central Powers in southeastern Europe, Asia Minor, Arabia,
Egypt, and the African area. Unlimited sources for raw materials would be guaranteed. New and
strategically favorable bases for further operations against the British Empire would be won. The
loss of Gibraltar would mean crucial difficulties for British import traffic from the South Atlantic.
Preparations for this operation must be begun at once so that they are completed before the U.S.A.
steps in. It should not be considered of secondary importance, but as one of the main blows
against Great Britain. 8
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Raeder again informed Hitler of the critical importance of Gibraltar to the British
Empire and of the benefits Germany would gain by its capture. This time the information
seemed to interest him. Hitler issued orders that preparations for an attack on Gibraltar
should speedily move forward, but still placed his hopes in SEA LION. Raeder conveyed
Hitler’s orders to his staff: “A landing is however, now as before, regarded by the
Fuehrer as the means by which, according to every prospect, an immediate, crashing end
can be made of the war. Yet the Fuehrer has no thought of executing the landing if the
risk of the operation is too high.”9
By September 10, the time for making a decision regarding SEA LION was near.
The war in the air had not progressed sufficiently to risk an invasion. The Naval Staff
war diary summarized the situation as follows:

The indispensable prerequisite for the undertaking (SEA LION) has not been achieved,
namely clear air command over the Channel. The shooting up of Boulogne of yesterday and today
by destroyers shows the enemy is testing our defensive powers. Planned preparations for SEA
LION would require the Luftwaffe now to concentrate less on London but more on Portsmouth
and Dover and the (British) fleet forces. The Luftwaffe High Command does not hold it proper to
come forward with such requirement to the Luftwaffe or to the Fuehrer now since he regards the
great assault on London as possibly decisive for the war and [feels] that the systematic and
prolonged bombing of London can provoke an enemy attitude which might make SEA LION
altogether unnecessary.10

Hitler chose not to use the earliest date—September 11—to issue the warning order for
the operation. He decided to postpone the decision until the last possible date—
September 14—and utilize a more favorable day for a landing, September 24, in lieu of
the earlier one on September 21. In announcing his decision, Hitler acknowledged that
the results of the air war were not clear. He still hoped the Luftwaffe’s strategic bombing
campaign would force the British to surrender and make invasion unnecessary. This was
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evident when on the next day he expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the air
war and stated that he had no thought of yet risking an invasion. 11
Hitler advised Jodl of his decision to postpone SEA LION, and in turn Jodl
informed his assistant, Warlimount, on September 10. Sensing that SEA LION was now
doubtful, Warlimount presented Jodl with a final draft of Fuehrer Directive No. 18 which
authorized its execution. Warlimount’s staff, in coordination with the High Commands
of each of the services, had carefully drafted the invasion directive. Jodl, annoyed at
being cornered on the issue, quickly took steps to stop debate at the staff level. 12 The
drafting of an execute order for SEA LION by the OKH planning staff and its final
submission by Warlimount suggests that there was a drive by the army to build
momentum for the operation. 13 However, the day of decision, September 11, came and
went with no activity concerning SEA LION. The Naval Staff, for its part, blamed the
Luftwaffe for SEA LION’s delay, noting that “the air war is being conducted
independently of requirements of the war at sea, as ‘absolute air war’ and the fact is that
execution of the landing operation has up to now been unaffected by the development of
the intensified air war and therefore for operational military reasons [landing] does not
yet come into question.”14 The Kriegsmarine, along with some in the OKH and OKW,
was concerned that a “bolt from the blue”—an order by Hitler to execute SEA LION—
might come in two days. But on September 13, the last day before the critical decision,
Hitler hinted that SEA LION was dead. 15
At a promotion ceremony for new colonel generals on September 13, Hitler met
with his military leaders. He was in a dilemma. The next day he had to make a decision
on SEA LION. Goering, who understood Hitler’s quandary, took advantage of the
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situation to promote himself and the Luftwaffe. 16 He gave Hitler a glowing report on the
progress of the air war, and advised him that over the next few days the Luftwaffe could
annihilate the RAF and bring the war to an end. According to Goering, the air war would
soon make SEA LION irrelevant. Hitler, who now had an opening, became cheerful and
“expressed himself most optimistically, and explained that in the current favorable [air]
situation he had no thought of accepting so great a risk as posed by a landing in
England.”17 This statement caused Jodl to believe that Hitler had decided to abandon
SEA LION completely. 18
The important conference took place on the afternoon of September 14. 19 Hitler
spoke concerning the possible invasion of Great Britain, acknowledging that it would
bring about the swift defeat of the enemy. He commended the Kriegsmarine for its
preparations and was especially laudatory toward the Luftwaffe. “Four or five more days
of good weather, and a decisive result will be achieved. . .,” he announced. “We have a
good chance to force Britain to its knees.”20 As Hitler lavished praise, he also pointed to
the obvious: the RAF had not been neutralized, which meant that a landing in England
remained problematic. He did not, however, intend to cancel the operation just yet. He
drew the following conclusions:
Attacks to date have had enormous effects, though perhaps chiefly upon nerves. Part of
that psychological effect is the fear of invasion. That anticipation of its imminence must not be
removed. Even though victory in the air should not be achieved before another ten or twelve days,
Britain might yet be seized by mass hysteria. If, within the coming ten or twelve days, we achieve
mastery of the air over a certain area, we could, by a landing operation, compel the enemy to come
out with his destroyers against our landing fleet. We could then inflict upon the enemy such
losses that he would no longer be able to protect his convoys. Cancellation of our plans would not
remain a secret. It would ease the strain on the enemy’s nerves, and consequently must not be
ordered now.21

The on-again, off-again invasion was thus still an option.
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Raeder then once again expressed skepticism about SEA LION, reiterating that
“the risk is very great.”22 He also pointed out that the air situation would not change
before the September 24-27 timeframe, and suggested that Hitler postpone the invasion
until at least October 8 or 24, which were the next favorable dates. 23 Hitler, in response,
authorized postponement only until September 17, the last suitable date for a landing that
month. 24 He hoped that a more favorable situation for the Germans would develop after
three more days of air attacks by the Luftwaffe.
The Fuehrer briefly mentioned the Mediterranean option, noting Franco’s
reluctance about Gibraltar and the danger of the Allies’ establishing an airbase in
northwest Africa. He also ordered planning for the dispatch of an armored corps to Libya
to assist Mussolini, who had launched his long-delayed attack on the British in Egypt the
day before. 25 Mussolini wanted to secure his share of glory before Hitler invaded Britain.
The Italian commander in Libya, General Rodolfo Graziani, had delayed the attack
several times since August 19, when Mussolini sent a telegram ordering him to march on
Egypt as soon as a German patrol landed in England. 26 The Italians hoped to reach the
Egyptian port of Alexandria quickly, but came to a permanent stop after fifty miles,
halfway to the British lines, near the Egyptian frontier town of Marsa Matruk. 27
The day for the fateful decision on SEA LION arrived on September 17. The
Luftwaffe had not yet defeated the RAF and British air and naval attacks on the French
Channel ports were interfering with invasion shipping assembly. The German weather
forecast for the Channel over next few days, furthermore, was not favorable. The
combination of heavy losses due to British air and naval action in the invasion ports,
along with the weather, prompted Hitler to postpone SEA LION.28
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The Luftwaffe itself by now had reached the conclusion that SEA LION was not
feasible. 29 Goering, who had never thought much of the operation, told his commanders
that SEA LION should not be allowed to interfere with Luftwaffe operations. 30 His
commanders were pleased with the decision. The German navy also wanted SEA LION
canceled altogether and shipping released and relocated from the invasion ports. Losses
in the Channel ports caused by RAF bomber raids and Royal Navy shelling had begun to
mount, causing considerable anxiety at OKM. The navy halted invasion shipping en
route to the French ports and made plans to disperse the vessels already concentrated at
the ports so that they would not be such easy targets for the British bombs and guns. 31
Fricke notified Jodl at OKW of the cancellation, and on September 19, OKW issued a
directive in line with OKM’s decisions:
Concentration of the transport fleet is to be stopped, insofar as it has not already been
completed. The ships assembled in the ports of departure are to be dispersed in such a way that
losses from enemy air attacks will be reduced to a minimum. However, it should remain possible
to reassemble the ships at the ports of departure on ten days notice under favorable weather
conditions.32

The directive ordered the Luftwaffe to increase air defense assets in the invasion port
areas. Although Hitler believed that the military was capable of carrying out SEA LION
within a ten-day alert period, many in the Kriegsmarine believed that OKW’s directive
signified that SEA LION was no longer a viable plan.
Meanwhile, German diplomatic pressure to bring Spain into the war had
intensified. On September 16, the day before Hitler was to make his decision on SEA
LION, Franco, on his own initiative, sent Ramon Serrano Suñer, his foreign minister, to
Berlin to express Spain’s desire for a closer relationship with Germany. 33 Suñer met with
his German counterpart, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and discussed with him the economic

47

and military difficulties arising from Spain’s costly civil war. Von Ribbentrop avoided
the subject of Gibraltar, but did point out the two countries’ ideological similarities, and
Germany’s assistance in Spain’s civil war. He assured Suñer that once Spain entered the
war, Germany would provide it with economic aid. His suggestion that Spain turn over
one of its islands in the Canary chain for a German military base brought a sharp reaction
from Suñer, and von Ribbentrop quickly dropped the subject. The meeting ended
without progress.
Suñer met the next day with the Fuehrer himself. 34 He told Hitler that Franco
remained true to his German friends, but could enter the war only after Spain had
overcome its economic difficulties. Franco feared a British landing on the Cantabrian
coast as well as British forays from Gibraltar, he explained, and therefore could not risk
war while Spain was in a weakened state. Hitler responded that Franco’s fears were
unfounded given Germany’s position on the continent. He said that, as in the Norwegian
campaign, German bombers could force the Royal Navy to remain outside of the
Luftwaffe’s range. The Gibraltar garrison, Hitler argued, could be overwhelmed with
aerial bombing, and its capture would not be difficult. Suñer immediately changed the
subject to trivial matters. Hitler realized that nothing would come of the meeting and
suggested that he and Franco discuss these matters directly, to which Suñer agreed.
Raeder understood the need to end the impasse in strategic decision- making and
on September 26, he requested an urgent conference with Hitler to present the case for a
Mediterranean option. 35 At their meeting, Raeder told Hitler that the British had always
considered the Mediterranean to be the pivot of their world empire. He pointed out that
the Admiralty maintained eight of Britain’s thirteen battleships in the region and that
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many of its vital war supplies shipped through the area. London now was preparing to
focus on Italy, its weaker foe. It was therefore vital that Germany seize Gibraltar, the
Canary Islands, the Suez Canal, and Northwest Africa. In Raeder’s opinion, it was
foolish to rely on the Italians to defeat Britain in the Mediterranean. He described Italy
as unreliable and hated throughout the Mediterranean area and said that it should not be
trusted with a lead role in this critical region. Hitler agreed with Raeder’s comments and
told him that he would confer immediately with Mussolini and possibly with Franco as
soon as the Tripartite Pact was concluded. 36 Reader also brought up lingering questions
concerning Hitler’s September 17 “indefinite postponement” order of SEA LION,
advising him that the navy would be unable to maintain readiness after mid-October. The
admiral pointed out that the reorganization of the entire Kriegsmarine for the SEA LION
had hampered the operation of battleships and the submarine training program. When he
requested a decision from Hitler on SEA LION by October 15, the Fuehrer did not
reply. 37
The next day, as the Tripartite Pact between the Axis and Japan was being signed,
Hitler met twice with Italy’s foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano. 38 He broached the
question of Spain’s participation in the war and the high price Franco demanded in
return, indicating that he was reluctant to pay that cost considering Spain’s record of
unreliability. When he proposed a meeting with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass to discuss
the matter, the count immediately accepted the idea. 39
By the end of September, the German army had begun to feel the strain of the
preparing for SEA LION. The OKH staff sent a memorandum to the OKW strongly
advocating abandonment of the ten-day alert policy for SEA LION, which was
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hampering the army’s training program. While Hitler would not give up on SEA LION’s
implementation, the German military was now actively pushing for other options. Most
of these options focused on the Mediterranean area, and Gibraltar was the primary
target. 40 All of the choices—Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Northwest Africa—would require
substantially fewer men and less equipment than SEA LION. Also, unlike with SEA
LION, Germany seemed capable of overwhelming any of the possible targets. The main
thing lacking was a decision at the highest level.
Uncertain on strategy, Hitler met with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass on October
4. He told the Duce that the “war is won, [and the] rest is a mere question of time.”41
Hitler explained why he had not yet launched an invasion of England, but assured his
Axis partner that he intended to attack the British, and that his chief target was Gibraltar.
The operation should be relatively easy, he pondered, but Franco was stubbornly refusing
to support for the project. Germany had aided Franco during the Spanish Civil War and
enabled him to gain power, he groused, but Franco was demanding an excessive amount
of territory and aid, while declining to assist Germany. Hitler’s complaints aside, what
impressed Ciano, who was present at the meeting, was the fact that the German leader
seemed to be focusing more on the Mediterranean theater, “which is good for us,” wrote
Ciano. 42 Mussolini, for his part, talked about his separate territorial ambitions and there
was no systematic discussion of a coordinated joint effort to drive the British out of the
Mediterranean. The meeting ended with Hitler telling Mussolini that he would write a
letter to Franco and also meet with him. Mussolini stated that he, too, would meet with
Franco.
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A week after his meeting with Mussolini, Hitler informed his military leaders that
he had decided to cancel SEA LION for the fall 1940. The order that Keitel issued in the
Fuehrer’s name started:
The Fuehrer has decided that preparations for the landing in Britain are to be kept up from
now until spring, merely as a means of exerting political and military pressure. Should a landing
in Britain be decided on again in the spring or early summer of 1941, the required degree of
readiness will be ordered at the proper time. Until then the military dispositions for a later landing
are to be further improved. All measures connected with relaxing readiness for combat are to be
ordered by the High Commands according to the following principles:
a.
b.

The British are to be left under the impression that we are still preparing a landing on
a wide front.
At the same time the strain on the German economy is to be eased.43

Hitler set spring 1941 as new target date for the SEA LION. He had missed his
best chance to defeat Great Britain by a direct invasion that summer 1940 and now turned
his attention more to the Mediterranean and Gibraltar, where he hoped Germany could
deal a setback to Great Britain.
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CHAPTER 6
GIBRALTAR AND OPERATION FELIX
Hitler failed to realize that he had to provide a strategic focus for Germany’s war
effort. Although he had delayed SEA LION until the next spring, he still believed this
operation was possible and was reluctant to accept any other proposal. This reluctance
was adversely affecting the German economy, war production, and other operations.
Many German general officers, on the other hand, considered SEA LION a dead issue
and were focusing on the Mediterranean and Gibraltar. 1 The Axis situation in the
Mediterranean area had deteriorated considerably by November as a result primarily of
sudden and unexpected Italian military disasters in Greece and Egypt. Some in the
German high command saw control of Gibraltar as the key to controlling the
Mediterranean and planning went forward. However, without Franco’s approval,
Germany would be forced to invade Spain in order to take Gibraltar.
On October 11, the day before Hitler delivered his order to halt SEA LION, vo n
Brauchitsch and Halder held a meeting on the status of the war. The most important
topic of discussion was Spain’s and Italy’s military positions in the Mediterranean area.
They both considered Gibraltar an important target for enhancing the Axis strategic
position, but agreed Spain could not be counted on for participation in any military
action. The entire Gibraltar operation—excluding intelligence and minimal support
roles—would have to be carried out entirely as an independent German undertaking.
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“Spain’s domestic situation is so rotten as to make it useless as a political partner,”
Halder wrote. “We shall have to achieve the objectives essential to us (Gibraltar) without
its active participation.”2 Regarding Italy, the two generals belittled its military
leadership. “Evidently the Italian command is lacking both ability and the means to
achieve any conclusive success,” Halder wrote. “Now the Italians show interest again in
getting aid from us. They want one armored division; transfer would take ten weeks, and
it would be the New Year before the division could go into action.”3 Although von
Brauchitsch considered the Mediterranean an attractive strategic alternative, Halder still
thought the best approach was to continue to apply direct pressure on Great Britain. The
meeting concluded with both generals’ agreeing to prepare for operations against
Gibraltar and in Libya.
The next morning, October 12, Halder selected General Ludwig Kuebler to lead
the assault on Gibraltar. Kuebler was an excellent mountain soldier with experience
going back to the arduous fighting in northern Italy during World War I. He was a harsh
taskmaster who constantly drove his troops to do more, but they loved him. With his
selection and with Hitler’s support, the preparations for an assault on Gibraltar now could
rapidly move forward. 4 The Abwehr mission to Spain weeks earlier had concluded that
the Rock could be seized by one infantry regiment and one and one- half pioneer
battalions, plus the artillery and support troops. Halder believed that the attacking force
would have to be larger, especially since the British defenders would have a very limited
capability for withdrawal, i.e., they really would have only two choices: fight or
surrender. One point that Halder and the Abwehr did agree on was that the element of
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surprise was unattainable and that the entire battle plan should be arranged as a set-piece
engagement. 5
The next day Halder presented a concept of operation against Gibraltar to
Kuebler, telling him to prepare for action in mid-December. On that same day, Halder
requested that specific troops be allocated for the proposed undertaking. He wanted the
1st Mountain Division’s elite 98th Mountain Regiment, the famous “Grossdeutschland”
regiment, 26 medium and heavy artillery battalions, three observation battalions, three
pioneer battalions, two smoke battalions, and the required support units. In addition, he
needed one or two motorized infantry divisions and nine medium artillery batteries in
reserve to counter any British landing on the Iberian Peninsula. The operation, he
estimated, would take six to eight weeks to complete. 6
Preparations for a Gibraltar operation began gaining momentum. Army and
Luftwaffe representatives held a conference on October 20 about the proposed attack.
Halder’s chief planner, Colonel Adolph Heusinger, requested that the Luftwaffe accept a
variety of missions including aerial reconnaissance, fighter cover for the assembly areas,
and close air support. In addition, the army wanted the Luftwaffe to deploy antiaircraft
units for protection against air attack and to provide direct fire support against point
targets on Gibraltar. The Luftwaffe’s operations chief, Colonel Otto Hoffmann von
Waldau, agreed to the army’s request and assigned a Luftwaffe liaison officer to
Kuebler’s headquarters to ensure coordination. 7
Because he knew that Spanish support was vital to a Gibraltar operation, Hitler
swallowed his pride and on October 24 traveled to Hendaye for a conference with
Franco. 8 Hitler immediately pressed Franco for an alliance and Spain’s entry into the war
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in January 1941, coupling this event with an attack on Gibraltar. The Spanish dictator
agreed to an alliance “in principle,” but would not commit to any participation in an
operation against Gibraltar. Hitler subsequently expressed his anger about Franco’s
attitude and he contemplated breaking off talks immediately. He later grumbled to the
Duce that he would rather have three or four teeth pulled than to sit through another
conference with Franco. 9
When General von Brauchitsch returned from the Spanish border, he informed
Halder of the discussion. “Franco wants to come out into hostility only after military
operations have actually started,” he said. The Spanish leader had indicated a willingness
to “join the Axis,” but had made no formal commitment. “It is quite evident,” von
Brauchitsch commented, “that Spain is still very much afraid of Britain.”10 Nevertheless,
on October 25, Halder sent out orders for the preliminary supply operation. He also
ordered the combat units—the 98th Mountain Regiment “Grossdeutschland,” the 106th
Artillery Command, and various support units—to re-deploy to the new training site at
Bescançon at once. Those troops began arriving at the training site on October 28. 11
As the OKW and Hitler were contemplating moves in the Mediterranean,
Mussolini completely changed the strategic picture by launching on October 28 an illadvised and ill-prepared campaign against Greece that caught Hitler and his military
leaders off guard. 12 Meeting with the Duce later that day in Florence, Hitler found it hard
to contain his rage. “In any event,” Halder noted in his diary, “the immediate effect is a
completely new picture of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.”13
This surprise move by Italy highlighted a significant trait of the Axis powers—their
failure to devise a coherent joint strategy.
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At the end of October, Hitler still had not made a firm commitment to attacking
Gibraltar and had not yet ordered the deployment of German troops to the Mediterranean
area. Recognizing a need for clarification of intentions, Halder on November 2 drafted a
report for Hitler in which he declared that a Gibraltar operation could be ready to begin
by the proposed target date of January 1, 1941. Regarding a possible operation in the
eastern Mediterranean, Halder was much less optimistic. To assist the Italian effort in
Libya, he estimated that Germany would need a panzer corps consisting of two armor
divisions and one motorized infantry division, along with a large number of special
support units. A lengthy time period would be required to transport this force, unless
there were unexpected improvements in Axis sealift capability. He noted that supplying
a German corps in Africa would be a huge operation and would complicate German
operations in Europe. He believed that a Gibraltar assault was, tactically and logistically,
the soundest plan of those being discussed and that a victory at Gibraltar could be more
easily attained than one in the eastern Mediterranean. He was aware of the difficulties of
a Gibraltar assault, but was optimistic about the outcome. 14
Later that day, Halder attended a conference with Canaris, Heusinger, Major Fritz
Kautschke, 15 and Colonel Otto Elfeld of his OKH staff in order to exchange intelligence
and to iron out operational details for the Gibraltar attack. Kautschke, the Abwehr station
chief in Algeciras, had worked closely with several Spanish officers and their staffs to
map with fine detail Gibraltar’s defenses. His lengthy report included photographs,
maps, and sketches. Impressed by the information Kautschke presented, Halder directed
him to turn over the briefing material to his staff for further study and to brief General
Kuebler’s assault force. 16
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As German military leaders made plans for a Gibraltar campaign, the combat
elements began conducting realistic training for assaulting a prepared enemy in
mountainous terrain and working out operational details, such as close air and artillery
coordination. The command staff also had to develop an intricate logistics support plan.
On November 2, an advance staff element left the Munich area for the Bescançon area in
France. Within two days, most of the assault corps had moved into various camps in the
Bescançon-Orleans-Angers-Cholt-Niort-Poitiers region. Realistic training began almost
immediately after their arrival, and focused on artillery skills such as hitting pinpoint
targets. Training also included solving problems related to an assault by combined arms
teams of engineers, riflemen, direct fire artillery, and signal groups on a strongly
entrenched enemy across a narrow strip of land with little or no surprise and cover.
During this training, officers enforced strict discipline over the participating units to
ensure realism. 17
Separately from these preparations, and unknown to the assault force, the Abwehr
began making plans of its own. Colonel Erwin Lahousen, Chief of the Sabotage branch
of the Abwehr, anticipated the need for special missions, and the “Brandenburg”
Regiment was the Abwehr’s choice for this task. These elite troops would be assigned to
remove the heavy iron fence separating Gibraltar and Spain and to keep the road there
open for the main assault force. Lahousen also envisioned Abwehr troops attacking and
destroying Gibraltar’s fuel supplies, airfield, power station, gas works, and plant for
distilling seawater. Canaris passed these special operations concepts to OKH for
acceptance. 18
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On November 4, Halder met with von Bauchitsch to update him regarding Spain
and Gibraltar. 19 Halder informed his boss that Franco’s reluctance to enter the conflict
had not changed. 20 Later that day, Hitler met with his top military leaders regarding the
general strategic picture. He agreed with his military chiefs that a battle in Libya was too
difficult and a German armor offensive could not be launched until at least the fall of
1942. Expressing little confidence in Italy’s generals and armies, he was pessimistic
about operating across an “ocean”—the Mediterranean—that Germany did not control.
Concerning Spain and Gibraltar, he mentioned Franco’s promise in a recent letter to enter
the war on Germany’s side. Nevertheless, Hitler wanted to expedite Spain’s entry into
the war and begin an operation against Gibraltar as soon as possible. He ordered the
assault force to deploy to the Franco-Spanish border. Hitler recognized that the British
would be alerted to the German plans by the movement of troops to the Spanish border,
so he ordered the Luftwaffe to be prepared to attack the British Royal Navy anchored at
Gibraltar as soon as the German army crossed into Spain. He also directed the OKH to
make plans for the defense of Spain’s Canary Islands and Portugal’s Cape Verde Islands
and to determine the most strategically feasible way to close the Gibraltar Strait after the
capture of the Rock. 21
By mid-November, it appeared that the Mediterranean was Germany’s main
focus. On November 12, Hitler issued Directive Number 18, which emphasized the
current importance of that area. The bulk of the text concerned Spain and the operation
against Gibraltar, now code-named Operation FELIX. The directive stated that the
purpose of the German assault on the Iberian Peninsula wo uld be to drive the British out
of that region by seizing Gibraltar and closing the narrow Strait. It went on to state that
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FELIX would involve mostly army and Luftwaffe participation and would consist of four
logical periods. The Kriegsmarine would play a smaller role by providing a wide picket
of submarines in the Atlantic. In the first phase, reconnaissance squads—military
officers dressed in civilian clothing—would conduct last- minute intelligence collection
against Gibraltar and the airfields nearby. The second phase would open with the first
direct attack on Gibraltar. Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units would stage a massive
surprise raid from newly acquired French airfields. The objective would be to clear
British ships from the harbor and to eliminate aircraft from the RAF airfield on Gibraltar.
Simultaneously, the German army assault group under Kuebler would cross the FrancoSpanish border and proceed to its assembly areas near Gibraltar. Shortly after the assault
force arrived opposite the Rock, the third phase—the ground assault on Gibraltar—could
go forward. In the final phase of the plan, German forces would establish themselves on
the Rock and close the strait. If necessary, they would occupy Spanish Morocco, too. To
execute FELIX, Hitler made clear that he was counting on the support of Spain. 22
Two days later, Hitler conferred with Raeder regarding the direction of the war.
They discussed mine warfare, the war in the Atlantic, advancements in landing craft for
possible use in SEA LION in 1941, a future attack on Russia, and the war in the
Mediterranean area. Raeder stressed the importance of Germany’s securing both the
eastern and western Mediterranean, and he emphasized the importance of taking action to
resolve the situation, linking the its outcome of this operation to the outcome of the war.
He was extremely critical of the Italian leadership and believed disaster was ahead.
According to his estimates, the recent Italian thrust into Greece had resulted in the
consolidation of Britain’s strategic naval position in the eastern Mediterranean, causing
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Britain to gain valuable prestige while Italy’s prestige plummeted. Raeder’s planners
concluded that the conditions for the Italian offensive against Egypt had deteriorated and
that Italy would never carry it out. 23
With all this in mind, Kriegsmarine planners feared that the situation in the
eastern Mediterranean would not develop favorably for the Axis and that the initiative
would pass to the enemy. They now believed that the position of the British in the
eastern Mediterranean would become so strong it would be impossible for the Germans
to expel them. On the other hand, if Germany gained control of Gibraltar, Spain’s ties
with the Reich would be strengthened, and the French colo nies in North Africa would be
less inclined to desert the Vichy government to join the Allies. The naval staff reasoned
that it would also have the important effect of driving the British Fleet from the western
Mediterranean area. In addition, control of North Africa and the Middle East would
provide Germany with vital raw materials such as cotton, copper, and oil along with
much needed foodstuffs. The additional food supplies would become important in
supplying Spain, which was almost wholly dependent on the Allies for vital deliveries. 24
Raeder pointed out that Italy’s strategic position would benefit from Gibraltar’s
capture. “The Italian armed forces have neither the leadership nor the military efficiency
to carry the required operations in the Mediterranean area to a successful conclusion with
the necessary speed and decision,” he said. He then passed on to Hitler the following
three conclusions reached by his staff:
(1) The German leaders responsible for the conduct of the war must in future plans take into
account the fact that no special operational activity, or substantial relief or support, can be
expected from the Italian armed forces.
(2) The entire Greek peninsula, including the Peloponnesos, must be cleared of the enemy, and all
bases occupied. If the Italians have in mind only a restricted operational purpose in Greece,
an appropriate change in policy should be suggested to them immediately. The occupation of
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southern Greece and western Egypt (Marsa Matruh) would considerably reduce the value of
Crete for the enemy.
(3) The enemy should be forced out of the Mediterranean by utilizing every conceivable
possibility. In this connection the demand that Italy carryout the Egyptian offensive must be
maintained and should be supported by Germany in every way.

Hitler remarked that he expected good results from the Gibraltar operation and the
subsequent closing of the Strait and that he believed future operations against northwest
Africa and Greece should be planned. He thought that the Italians should be pressured to
seize Marsa Matruh and to concentrate on destroying the British Fleet anchored in
Egypt. 25
With the issuance of Directive 18, Hitler pushed hard for Spain to enter the war.
He invited Serrano Suñer, the Spanish foreign minister, to the Berghof on November 18
for the stated reason of continuing the exchange of views begun earlier at Hendaye. 26
Count Ciano, who attended the meeting, recorded in his diary that the Germans were in a
gloomy mood upon Suñer’s arrival. 27 Suñer wanted immediate assistance for Spain and
asked Hitler to understand the difficult position Spain faced. Hitler responded that the
solution was for Spain to join the war and to grant German troops passage to Gibraltar.
Suñer ignored Hitler’s comments and moved on to a discussion of Spain’s territorial
demands, a subject which Hitler refused to discuss. Hitler assured him that Spain would
be rewarded for joining the winning side and pressed for Spain’s cooperation, but Suñer
continued to evade the question. The next day, Suñer met in Berchtesgaden with his
German counterpart, von Ribbentrop, who was also unable to gain any concessions from
the coy Spaniard. 28
Although Hitler had been unable to gain Spanish approval, Halder issued orders
for FELIX on November 20. The orders closely followed instructions laid out in
Directive 18 and in earlier planning. Halder placed Field Marshal Walther von
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Reichenau in general command of the entire ground operation. Subordinate to him were
the two corps commanders. Corps XLIX (assault) was under General Kuebler, while
Corps XXXIX (flank protection) would be under General Rudolf Schmidt. Hitler
insisted on operational surprise for the attack and added that troops might be needed
immediately after FELIX for employment in North Africa. This new information forced
Jodl to convene a major joint-service conference a week later to review coordination of
the attack. At that meeting there were surprisingly few disagreements among the
different services. 29
Berlin received encouraging signals from Madrid on November 28. Franco told
the German ambassador that he had decided to intensify collaboration with Germany and
to expedite Spain’s participation in the war. 30 The next day, the German envoy submitted
an extensive evaluation of his conversation with Franco. Although the Caudillo feared
British military reprisal and the loss of grain shipments, he had indicated his desire to set
an early date for Spain’s entry into the war, receive German military experts for the
assault on Gibraltar, and accept a liaison officer to iron out disagreements between the
two countries. With these new developments, the Germans felt that FELIX could go
forward. The combat elements had completed their rigorous training programs and were
ready for the operation. The supplies and support troops were in place and set to move.
Only the final word from Franco and then the order from Hitler were holding up the
operation. On December 2, Hitler informed the OKW staff that Franco had agreed to
allow FELIX to take place in February 1941, with the exact date to be left to the
Germans.
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On the following morning, December 3, Raeder met with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl.
“Gibraltar must be seized, which would mean a very heavy loss in prestige for Britain,”
the admiral insisted, “This would result in control of the western Mediterranean. Later, if
it were still necessary, action could be taken in the eastern Mediterranean.”31 Raeder
advised Hitler that the navy was prepared for the operation and that fortification of the
Canary Islands was under negotiation. The following day, Hitler dispatched Canaris to
Spain to pressure Franco into accepting the German attack plan. 32
On December 5, Hitler held a conference on FELIX attended by Halder, von
Brauchitsch, Keitel, and Jodl, which lasted for more than four hours. Von Brauchitsch
advised Hitler that the initial reconnaissance group would depart for the Iberian Peninsula
the following day. For various reasons, January 10, 1941 was set as the last possible date
for the initial air attack with the ground attack commencing on February 4 or 5. If FELIX
was going to take place, the order to execute needed Hitler’s authorization within the next
ten days. The planning staff believed that the entire campaign would take only about four
weeks, the end of which would quickly free troops for a campaign in the Balkans and
later in Russia. 33
Following von Brauchitsch’s report, Halder pointed out that it would be at least
twenty-five days from the time German troops crossed the Franco-Spanish border before
they could be ready to launch an attack. At the time of the initial Luftwaffe attack, the
troops at the Spanish border would immediately proceed toward Gibraltar. In order to
accomplish this, the assault force, support troops, and supply trains would need to move
from their current locations and assemble at the border without alerting the British—an
almost impossible task. When the conference ended, Hitler seemed to be firmly in
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support of FELIX. In his diary, Halder summarized his impression of Hitler’s thoughts
on the subject:
Seizure of Gibraltar: The psychological impact of the Italian defeats makes the capture
necessary. It is not required that England fall through combat but through a number of blows (air
force, submarines), to include a cordon of international combinations. In that context the fall of
Gibraltar—a symbol of British power—is a decisive element.34

With the military in its final stages of preparation, it was up to Hitler to obtain Franco’s
formal consent and to give the order for attack.
On December 7, Hitler held his final conference on FELIX. The meeting,
attended by the commanders of OKH and OKW, focused on the ground attack portion of
the operation. Kuebler used a detailed terrain model of Gibraltar to outline each step of
the planned attack. Von Richthofen discussed the role of the Luftwaffe and talked about
possible targets. The meeting concluded with all agreeing that the assault plan looked
militarily sound and should be effective. Warlimont then gave Jodl a draft of Directive
19 authorizing FELIX. The deadline for issuance of the formal directive was set for
December 16, but more importantly, Hitler authorized a reconnaissance staff to leave for
Spain that day, December 7, initiating the first phase of the operation. 35
Hitler appeared ready to implement FELIX. All he needed was Franco’s
authorization—which was the main obstacle. Hitler waited anxiously to hear from
Canaris, who had been dispatched to Madrid on December 4 to obtain Franco’s
authorization. The Abwehr Chief informed Franco of the details of FELIX and assured
him that Germany would give economic assistance to Spain when German troops crossed
the border. Franco, however, still would not agree to the operation. He pointed to
Spain’s deplorable economic state, the British control of the high seas, the American
threat to Spain’s outer islands, and the poor state of the Spanish military as reasons why
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Spain could not support the German proposal. Canaris asked Franco for an approximate
date when Spain might be ready to participate. Franco refused to answer this question
also, and the meeting ended. 36
After the meeting, Canaris immediately drove to the German embassy to cable a
summary of the discussion to Berlin. Keitel at once passed the cable to Jodl, who
brought it to the immediate attention of Hitler. The Fuehrer was shocked at the news. He
had invested too much time and political prestige in the venture to be stopped by a
stubborn and ungrateful Franco. He ordered Canaris to renew his attempts to gain
approval for the attack. On December 10, the admiral sent a second cable to Berlin
stating that he was still unable to get Franco’s consent. He stated that the reasons for this
failure were Spain’s economic and civil problems along with Germany’s lack of progress
in the war against Britain. It now appeared certain that Franco would withhold his
commitment until Germany decisively defeated Great Britain. 37
Time had run out for the Germans. If the operation were going to take place in
February 1941, Hitler would have to issue immediate orders to the various army,
Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine units. Because Hitler was unable to obtain the political
support of Franco, on December 11 he ordered the immediate termination of all
preparations for FELIX. 38 He authorized the reconnaissance teams already in Spain to
continue their mission, but ordered that all other efforts should stop. The reluctance of
the Spanish dictator had accomplished what most other European countries had failed to
do: stop the German military.
After the December 11 decision to halt preparations for FELIX, Hitler and the
OKW focused on problems created by Mussolini’s invasion of Greece and on the
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upcoming offensive in Russia. Since the beginning of his invasion of Greece, the Italians
had fared poorly. On December 4, Mussolini had instructed the Italian Ambassador to
Germany, Dino Alfieri, to appeal for German help in Greece. Then on December 12 the
British launched a surprise offensive in Egypt. The quick success of this action turned
Hitler’s attention back to the Mediterranean. News from North Africa compounded the
bad news from Greece. While the Italian commander in Libya, Marshal Graziani,
procrastinated in moving against the British in Egypt, the British commander launched an
offensive against the static Italians. “News of the attack of Sidi Barrani came like a
thunderbolt,” Count Ciano wrote. 39 That afternoon Graziani reported that the British had
destroyed five Italian divisions. Worse, he did not suggest that Italy had any plan to
counter the British advance. By December 15, Graziani had decided that the only factor
that could salvage the situation was the massive introduction of German aviation in
Libya. Soon afterward, Mussolini realized, too, that German help would be necessary. 40
The Italian disasters forced Hitler to reevaluate German interest in the entire area.
On December 27, he conferred with his top military leaders in Berlin. Although the
conference centered on the deterioration of the Mediterranean, Raeder tried to dissuade
Hitler from attacking Russia in the spring. He wanted to keep Britain as the main enemy
and not overstrain Germany’s resources. Hitler listened, but did not comment. Raeder
expressed a pessimistic view of the situation. He pointed out the following:
The enemy has assumed the initiative at all points, and is everywhere conducting successful
offensive actions – in Greece, Albania, Libya, and East Africa; in addition, an imminent and
effective attack on the Italian Dodecanese Island may be expected, all the result of Italy’s serious
strategic blunder. The navy views developments in the Mediterranean area with grave misgivings.
Apart from the considerable prestige gained by Britain, the military and strategic success must not
be underestimated. The threat to Egypt, and thus to Britain’s position in the entire Eastern
Mediterranean, in the Near East, and in the North African area, has been eliminated with one
stroke. British gains are: Strong consolidation of the Eastern Mediterranean position; control of
the Mediterranean; the possibility of withdrawing heavy air, army, and naval forces from Egypt to
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be sent to Greece. The withdrawal of air units and army formations and their transfer to the Greek
zone has already been observed. The construction of air bases in Greece is in progress. The fact
that naval forces, battleships, and cruisers have been transferred from the Mediterranean to the
Atlantic is of great significance for naval warfare. 41

The admiral asked Hitler his opinion regarding the situation in Italy, such as Mussolini’s
ability to retain power and the will of the Italian people to continue supporting the war.
Hitler’s answer reflected the obvious—that there was a complete lack of leadership in
Italy. Raeder then spoke regarding the impact of these latest developments. First, Italian
prestige in the region had deteriorated decisively, affecting Rome’s ability to remain in
the war. Secondly, it was unlikely that Italy and Germany could drive the British Fleet
from the Mediterranean. “The decisive action in the Mediterranean for which we had
hoped,” he concluded, “is therefore no longer possible.”42
If Raeder was pessimistic about the current military situation in the
Mediterranean, he was still convinced of Gibraltar’s strategic importance and of the need
for FELIX to go forward. He told Hitler:
The significance of German occupation of Gibraltar is increased by the recent
developments in the Mediterranean situation. Such occupation would protect Italy; safeguard the
western Mediterranean; secure the supply lines from the North African area, important for Spain,
France, and Germany; eliminate an important link in the British Atlantic convoy system; close the
British sea route through the Mediterranean to Malta and Alexandria; restrict the freedom of the
British Mediterranean Fleet; complicate British offensive action in Cyrenaica and Greece; relieve
the Italians; and make possible German penetration into the African area via Spanish Morocco.
Spanish ports, i.e., Ferrol and Cadiz, are necessary for submarines and battleships, to facilitate
attack on convoys. Conclusion: Occupation of Gibraltar is of great importance for the
continuation of German warfare. The strategic reasons for speedy execution of Operation FELIX
still hold good.43

Hitler was in full agreement—the stumbling block remained Franco. Hitler told Raeder
that he would try again to gain Franco’s approval, but in reality, the Fuehrer did little
more to try to change Franco’s mind. In a letter to Mussolini on December 31, he
renewed his complaints about Franco’s ingratitude. If the Spanish leader had cooperated,
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he said, German troops would already have closed the Strait and removed that threat to
French North and West Africa. With this letter, Hitler seemed to ha ve put to rest the
nagging issue of Gibraltar and of Spain’s possible inclusion as an Axis power.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
By the end of 1940, Germany had lost the best opportunity it would have to attack
and defeat Great Britain. Due to considerable military and political risk, Hitler failed to
confront Britain at a time when the situation was most favorable for Germany. Hitler had
wasted precious time during June and July as he waited in vain for Britain to accept his
peace terms. In September, as the army completed its preparations for a landing in
southern England, he called off the operation after the Luftwaffe failed to defeat the RAF.
Focusing on Gibraltar as an alternative from October until December, Hitler tried to
secure Spain’s entry into the war and support for FELIX. Franco repeatedly denied both.
As December drew to a close, Hitler promised Raeder that he would renew his efforts to
gain Spanish approval for an operation against Gibraltar. In reality, Hitler hardly tried
and FELIX faded into history much like SEA LION. By then, he was focused on
problems in the Balkans and was planning for Operation BARBAROSSA.
Until SEA LION was postponed indefinitely on October 12, 1940, Hitler
repeatedly had acknowledged that direct invasion was the surest strategy to defeat the
British. His realized the importance of attacking and defeating Great Britain, but he
could not bring himself to begin the operation. Hitler’s behavior and decisions were
erratic, and he often misled his own military and civilian leaders. This lack of direction
resulted in many wasted man-hours spent planning operations that never took place, re-
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deploying and training troops for these operations, and most importantly it gave the
British time to recover from their initial defeats. After the war, the famous German
tactician General Fritz Erich von Lewinski Manstein wrote in his book Lost Victories:
When the head of a State or a war machine has to ask himself ‘What next?’ after his
military operations have entirely fulfilled – or, as in this case, far exceeded – his expectations,
leading to one enemy’s defeat and causing the other to beat a retreat to his island fastness, one
cannot help wondering whether such a thing as a ‘war plan’ ever existed on the German side. 1

Von Manstein placed the blame for Germany’s failure squarely on the shoulders of
Hitler, because he refused to listen to his military commanders on matters of strategy.
Hitler himself made clear that his views on military planning were what mattered and
“the fact that all three service staffs conducted their own internal studies of long-term
policy made not a scrap of difference.”2
Hitler’s lack of knowledge and fear of naval operations may explain his failure to
plan for an invasion of England immediately after the conquest of France. “I am watershy,” he once remarked. “On land I am a lion, but on the water I don’t know where to
begin.”3 Hitler’s anxiety with regard to amphibious operations was apparent early in
1940 during the Norwegian campaign. After a successful landing at the strategic
Norwegian town of Narvik, German Alpine troops under the command of General
Edward Dietl became trapped by a larger Allied naval task force. Hitler flew into a
panic. He ordered Keitel to draft a desperate evacuation order. Keitel never sent the
order and Dietl’s position improved, but the incident illustrated Hitler’s insecurities
concerning naval matters. 4
After SEA LION’s viability began to appear less and less likely, Hitler looked
more closely at options in the Mediterranean area. He pondered possibilities from Libya
to Gibraltar. His military leaders tried to show that capture of Gibraltar would be the
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most effective way to attack Great Britain without having to place a large segment of the
German military machine at risk—and this is a point to which Hitler and his generals
returned again and again during late 1940. This option should have appealed to Hitler. It
would be a land-based operation on the European continent—his area of expertise. By
early December, he had invested a significant amount of political prestige in trying to get
Franco’s approval for FELIX. Hitler recognized the importance of Gibraltar, its effect on
the war in the Mediterranean, and the immense benefit to be had by its capture; however,
he hesitated to order his military to march through Spain and capture it. Why?
Hitler asked Franco twice for an unequivocal commitment to enter the war; both
times Franco told Hitler no. Why did Hitler allow Spain to remain neutral? According to
historian Wayne Bowen, Hitler was:
Distracted by the Battle of Britain and focused on acquiring territory in the East, Hitler
made a strategic blunder of monumental proportions after the collapse of France. Spain could not
have resisted a German invasion, nor would the population, still exhausted after the Spanish Civil
War, have been able to put up mu ch of a fight. In short, Hitler allowed Franco to say no and later
blamed the Spanish dictator for his own inattention to the importance of Spain and Gibraltar. 5

At the time, Hitler, however, feared that any forced entry into Spain would degenerate
into conflict similar to Napoleon’s Peninsular War. 6 At a military conference on January
9, 1941, he ordered that all preparations for FELIX be discontinued. 7 With this order,
Hitler closed the book on what was Germany’s best opportunity for successfully
attacking Great Britain in 1940 and improving its strategic position, and that of its weaker
Axis ally, Italy. 8
After the end of the war there was debate in German military circles on which
course would have produced the best results in 1940. Von Manstein wrote that the failure
to launch an invasion of Great Britain had been the greatest strategic blunder. Although
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he acknowledged the risk, he believed that the possible victory would be much more
complete. He did not see action at Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean as decisive.
Britain’s lifeline to its Far and Middle East colonies would remain open around the Cape
of Good Hope. It was only the capture of the English Isles that would remove the
looming threat to Germany’s western flank.
Admiral Raeder did not share von Manstein’s view of the situation. He was
horrified at the prospect of launching an invasion of Great Britain. In April 1940, he had
lost most of his surface fleet in the Norwegian campaign. With his remaining meager
resources, he foresaw little hope of defending the invasion armada and its subsequent
supply lines from determined attacks by the British Royal Navy. But at Gibraltar, he saw
real possibilities. If Gibraltar was in German hands, the British could be forced out of the
western Mediterranean and the Reich might have been able to establish an effective
blockade of Great Britain. Furthermore, the capture of Gibraltar might have led to a
successful Axis drive on Cairo and the oil- rich Middle East at minimal risk to German
forces. Raeder tried in vain to impress these views on Hitler.
By early 1941, Hitler had changed his focused to his ideological enemy in the
East and regarded the Mediterranean as a mere sideshow. 9 He had returned to his prewar
worldview expressed in Mein Kampf, of expanding his control into the USSR and of
eliminating the communist threat. In addition, Hitler reasoned that if Moscow were
defeated London would have few options other than to end the war through a negotiated
peace. Although he expressed grave concern in Mein Kampf about a two- front war,
Hitler now brushed away these concerns, and assumed that Germany would win a rapid
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victory in the East. In Hitler’s opinion, Germany’s best chance for victory was fighting a
preventative war against Stalin. 10
After the fact, Hitler must have realized his error in not seizing Gibraltar in 1940
when he had no other military commitments. According to historian Charles Burdick,
Hitler believed that “Spain was the key to Germany’s defeat.” In early 1945, as Germany
was crumbling, Hitler himself stated that “taking advantage of the enthusiasm we had
aroused in Spain and the shock to which we had subjected Britain, we ought to have
attacked Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, immediately after the defeat of France.”11
Hitler was possibly correct in this hindsight analysis. For after the summer of 1940,
Great Britain was never again in danger of being invaded and defeated. The island nation
eventually became a springboard for the second front, which led to Germany’s defeat.

End Notes
1

Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 153

2

Hitler quoted in Ibid, p. 154.

3

Hitler quoted in Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, p. 143. It is also interesting that Hitler never
learned to swim.
4

For more on the campaign in Normandy see Bernard Ash, Norway.

5

Wayne H. Bowen, Spaniards and Nazi Germany, p. 80.

6

Although this was a real possibility, it was also possible that a large part of the Spanish population would
passively watch as German troops massed for an attack on Gibraltar. During the summer 1940 and beyond,
Germany established close ties with the Spanish Falange (believers in a New Order and closely resembled
the Nazis) and Spanish officers in hopes of putting pressure on Franco to enter the war. For more
information see Bowen, Spaniards and Nazi Germany, pp. 77-102, 221-229.
7

United States, Department of the Navy, Fuehrer Directives and other Top-level Directives of the German
Armed Forces, 1939-1945, I, 131.
8

After Operation FELIX was shelved in early 1941, Germany planned to send troops into Spain upon the
landing of British forces in that country or Portugal. By late 1943, Germany abandoned any notion of
sending troops into Spain and planned to defend the Pyrenees mountain passes along the Franco-Spanish
border. For more see Charles B. Burdick, Germany’s Military Strategy and Spain in World War II.
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9

German aviation began arriving in the Mediterranean in January 1941 and made their presence known by
seriously damaging the British carrier Illustrious and several other warships. General Erwin Rommel and
the Afrika Korps began arriving in February 1941. For more on Rommel and the war in North Africa see
Ronald Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander and General Friedrich von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles.
10

For a more in-depth analysis of Hitler’s thinking during this period see Alan Clark, Barbarossa, pp. 2227.
11

Hitler quoted in Burdick, Germany’s Military Strategy, p. 2.
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